In this paper, we use redistricting to examine the relationship between representatives and a unique group of the public: individual campaign contributors. By way of a continuous measure of district change, we examine 20 years of congressional elections data to test how incumbent campaign fundraising activity changes after redistricting. We find that as the geographic constituency changes, members receive larger shares of contributions from outside their districts. When we look at the parties separately, the immediate effect is larger for Republicans but returns to pre-redistricting behavior in the last period before districts change again. The impact is smaller for Democrats but always remains significant in each election after redistricting. This result is important because contributors who reside outside Fenno's concentric circles of representation live in areas that are different compared to other donors. In addition, larger shares of outside donations are positively correlated with more extreme voting behavior.
"That is agony. I thought: All these relationships! All these friendships! All this service! You know, what is it all about?" -U.S. Rep. Timothy Johnson (R-IL) (quote appears in Fahrenthold (2011)) The relationship between a legislator and her supporters is the foundation upon which much politics rests. In this regard, Richard Fenno's Home Style masterfully conveyed the connections that members of Congress have with their districts and constituents when he noted that representatives often describe their districts in terms geographical space-and-place (Fenno 1978, 2) . This foundation, however, is prone to move over time. The decennial process of reappointment and redistricting, much like the movement of tectonic plates, may cause slight tremors in some districts and wreak havoc on the political landscape elsewhere. Although most of a district remains intact after redistricting, some parts of the district may be removed while other areas are added. New district boundaries present both challenges and opportunities to members of Congress. For some, like Rep. Johnson, redistricting severs bonds they have carefully cultivated through years of service and personal contacts. For others, redistricting offers the opportunity to grow new relationships and establish electoral security, but developing relationships with new constituents takes time and effort. As Representative Susan Davis told her new constituents, "We'll need your help introducing us -telling us who we should know and when to get together with folks and what meetings are going on" (quote appears in Stone 2012) .
In this paper, we will use redistricting to examine the relationship between representatives and a unique group of the public: individual campaign contributors. By way of a continuous measure of district change, we use 20 years of congressional elections data to test how a member modifies her campaign fundraising behavior after her district is altered. In short, we find that the more a district changes, members receive larger shares of contributions from outside their districts. Moreover, even 10 years after redistricting, members do not turn back to their pre-change behavior. This result is important because representatives who take money from non-constituents may start to create a bond with individuals who reside outside Fenno's concentric circles of representation.
In the next section, we briefly review redistricting and campaign finance literature in order to develop theory and hypotheses about individual campaign contributions to incumbent members of Congress originating from different geographic locations. Building on this, we are able to determine the influence of redistricting on a member's ability to fundraise and present results that show a difference between the two parties. Next, we show how contributors who give to members outside their districts differ from other donors. Finally, we conclude and offer suggestions for future research.
Previous Research

Responses to Redistricting
Redistricting can influence the relationship between a member of Congress and her constituents in many ways. For example, the simple act of drawing new citizens into a district, even fellow co-partisans, can cause electoral difficulties for an incumbent ) that in turn can weaken representational ties (Yoshinaka and Murphy 2011) . Altering an incumbent's district can initially lower the "personal vote" or incumbency advantage a member has accrued (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2000; Desposato and Petrocik 2003; Hood and McKee 2008) Others have demonstrated that while members will alter their voting behavior to reflect their new constituencies (Glazer and Robbins 1986; Stratmann 2000; Boatright 2004; Bertelli and Carson 2011) , representatives do not always adapt in predictable ways when population change is especially large (Crespin 2010) . Since voters may not recognize or know much about their new member and, in turn, representatives do not always adapt to represent the median of their redrawn districts, it seems likely other important aspects of congressional campaigns, such as making contributions, could be affected by redistricting.
Individual Campaign Contributors
A large share of the campaign fundraising literature focuses on political action committees (see e.g. Jacobson 1980; Wright 1985; Hall and Wayman 1990; Cigler and Loomis 1991; Romer and Snyder 1994; Smith 1995; Stratmann 1995; Wright 1996; Herrnson, Shaiko and Wilcox 1998; Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005; Herrnson2007; Jacobson 2012 ) and overlooks individual campaign contributions, even though they make up over half of all contributions to congressional elections (Herrnson 2007; Jacobson 2012) . Some of the earliest to study individual contributors were Jones and Miller (1985) who found that voters, people who were interested in politics and respondents who felt a high degree of civic duty contributed to candidates. Grenzke (1988) took a more geographic approach and demonstrated that over 50 1 Scholars examining old and new voters have presented evidence of partisan implications (Petrocik and Desposato 1998 , McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon 2006 , McKee 2008b percent of individual and nearly all PAC contributions come from outside of members' districts.
However, most of the out-of-district money did come from inside the member's state.
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In perhaps the most comprehensive study of individual donors to date, Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell and Wilcox (2003, 105) observed that, "Geography is the most important factor influencing contribution decisions." They also found that contributors were, for the most part, rich, highly educated white males. However, reasons for contributing were quite varied.
They stylize three types of contributors, "investors" who gave for financial gain; "ideologues" who gave for more broad societal reasons and finally "intimates" who gave for reasons of solidarity, such as a personal relationship with the candidate or their fundraising surrogates.
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Descriptive accounts of individual fundraising (Grenzke 1988; Herrnson 2007 ) point out that a significant portion of funds come from outside a member's district with a non-trivial fraction originating outside of the state. Since candidates need money to win elections they will act as expected to raise funds. Research shows that money is clustered geographically (Gimpel, Lee and Kaminski 2006; Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011) and flows to competitive races for partisan advantage (Gimpel, Lee and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008) . Until recently, redistricting scholars have not paid much attention to how altering district boundaries can influence campaign fundraising. Exceptions include Boatright (2004) who demonstrated that candidates increase their total fundraising (PAC and individual) in response to partisan and racial changes in their districts and Kirkland (nd) which shows line drawers take wealth concentration into account during the redistricting process.
Redistricting and Campaign Contributions
Geography is an important determinant of individual contribution (Cho and Gimpel 2007) , but donor networks do not develop in a vacuum. Individuals do not give simply because they reside in the same district as the member. Many give because they expect something in exchange for their contributions (Snyder 1990 ). These donors are deemed "investors" by Francia et al. (2003) . These types of contributors are in search of narrow benefits for their particular industry, company, or even their personal financial situation.
However, it may not be correct to assume that all donors are seeking tangible benefits. Francia et al. (2003) also found that others, deemed "intimates", give for solidary or social motives. Similar to the interest group literature (e.g. Olsen 1971), these contributors donate for the psychological rewards that come from the social aspect of giving. Consistent with solidary motivations, this type of contributor will give when invited to a fundraiser or directly asked by the candidate or a close friend. Some intimates stated "that friendship with a candidate or a solicitor was always important in helping them to decide to contribute" (Francia et al. 2003, 47) .
Other intimate contributors acknowledged that local community ties played a major role in their decision calculus. In other words, there needs to be a strong social or local connection between the contributor and the campaign for an intimate to donate. Although the initial hypothesis is straightforward, we can use what we know about different investor types -investors and intimates -to make secondary hypotheses. Arguably these hypotheses are not as clear-cut but we feel important to test them anyway. It seems consistent with the motivations for investors that they will contribute for maximum returns. If this is indeed the case, then geographic ties should matter less for this class of donors; when investors find themselves in another district, they may still send a check to the "old" member. In addition, Francia et al. (2003, 43) suggest that investors may give a contribution as a reward for past behavior such as supporting a particular piece of legislation. This means investors give in a retrospective fashion and may wait and evaluate a new member before making a contribution. In essence, investors operate under a "try before you buy strategy". Finally, investors may continue to give to the old member hoping rewards will continue to flow their way. If they do not, the contributions will likely stop.
Combined, this implies a member relying on investor class contributors will have to wait before receiving any sort of benefit from new constituents, but might continue to receive contributions from previous investor type contributors who now reside outside the district. This translates to an initial decrease in in-district contributions relative to the rest of the state.
When it comes to intimates, who give based on existing social ties, we expect the influence of redistricting to be smaller compared to a member who is dependent on investor type donors. This is because intimates still have the same social network after redistricting. When members collect most of their contributions from intimates, we still expect to see a decline in indistrict contributions but the decline should be less than a similar member who depends on investors.
According to the Francia et al. (2003, 105) contributions. In our analyses, we largely focus on the ratio of in-district contributions relative to total in-state contributions but examine the out-of-state contributions as a "control" since these areas did not receive the "treatment" of redistricting and these contributions should not be influenced by district changes. Specifically, our main dependent variable is the ratio ranging from zero to 100 of a member's total in-district contributions to the member's total in-state contributions (which includes in-district contributions). In addition to the main variables of interest, we include several controls that are specific to the incumbent, the particular election, and the district or state. Factors that are specific to the incumbent include their seniority, the committees they serve on and their party affiliations. Most of these variables are relatively standard in the congressional literature. A member's Seniority is measured as the number of terms that an incumbent has served. We expect that the more senior the member, the larger his or her contribution network will be and hence more contributions should come from outside the district.
Another member factor that may influence incumbents' fundraising abilities is their committee assignments. Members on "constituent committees" should be well placed to provide particularized benefits to their constituents who should be more likely to give to their own representative. Representatives serving on "prestige committees" deliver goods that are not as geographically concentrated. Therefore, they should earn more money from beyond their districts' borders. If a member served on a constituency committee in the term of Congress preceding reelection, then the dichotomous variable Constituency Committee is coded one, zero otherwise. Prestige Committee is also coded one if the member served on a prestige committee.
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Because prior research suggests different styles of contributing predominate among Democrats and Republicans, we also include a variable Democrat that is equal to one if the member is a Democrat, zero otherwise.
Factors particular to the election include the natural log of Challenger Spending and if the incumbent faced an experienced, or Quality Challenger. 10 If a member is facing a well-funded and/or quality challenger, a cue that the incumbent is vulnerable (Jacobson 2012) , then he or she will have greater demand for contributions and may devote more time and effort to raising funds.
There are also factors related to the member's district that may influence where a candidate raises funds. If a member is from a relatively wealthy district, then he or she should be less likely to look outside the district for money. To control for this, we included District Median Income which is the median household income for the member's district. 11 We also expect members from relatively small districts to look elsewhere for contributions so we also include a control for District Population. 12 Members from districts that lean one way or the other politically may also need to look somewhere else for funds to bolster their re-election chances.
9 Following the guidance of Smith and Deering (1990) Our research design is then essentially an unbalanced panel with dropout restricted to incumbent members of Congress who experienced a redistricting and ran for reelection. Once a member loses, they are dropped and newly elected members are only included if they are running for reelection after redistricting. 14 We then estimate our models using fixed effect regressions for panel data where the panel variable is set for each incumbent.
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Results
The results from our estimations are presented in Table 1 and Figures 1 through 3. We provide model one as a baseline and model five to determine if out of state contributions are affected by redistricting. The negative and significant coefficients on each of the % New variables in model two indicate that the more districts change the ratio of in-district contributions 13 We obtained data on incumbent party's vote share in prior presidential election from CQ's Politics in America as well as Gary Jacobson.
to the state total decreases. Since these coefficients represent marginal changes, we can multiply them by the mean % New for each period to get an idea of how this influences the average member. 16 In the election just after redistricting, the average member sees the ratio decline by just over 7 percent. This drops to 2.4 percent in the middle election, and 1.2 in the election just before the new round of redistricting. These results support our hypothesis that redistricting will lead to a relative decrease in in-district campaign contributions. We should also point out that even in the last period ten years after redistricting the effect of district change while small, is still significant. This means contribution patterns never revert back to their pre-redistricting norms.
The predicted effect of district change on the typical incumbent's ratio of in-district contributions during the 1992 to 2010 congressional election cycles is presented in Figure 1 .
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This figure is particularly illustrative of the importance of measuring change as a continuous variable and not treating all redistricting equally. We see that the financial support a member could expect to receive from his or her district declines the more his or her district changed as the result of redistricting. Members that represent districts with little to no change actually see an increase in the amount of in-district contributions after redistricting relative to districts with a lot of change. The impact of district change on local support is particularly severe immediately following redistricting, producing a cyclical pattern over these election cycles.
The coefficients on the control variables are also instructive. As we can see from Figure   2 , as seniority increases members get larger shares of their contributions from parts of their states outside of their own districts. This is consistent with Fenno's (1978) idea that members have an 16 The mean actually decreases each year suggesting members with more new constituents have dropped out of our sample because they lost or decided to retire. It ranges from 27 percent in the election immediately after redistricting to a low of 11 percent in the year before the new redistricting.
expansionist phase of their careers but adds the additional aspect that members do more than just reach out to new voters that reside in the geographic constituency. The results also indicate that members will earn contributions from outside their districts when they face well-financed challengers. 18 When the incumbent share of the presidential vote is not in their favor, representatives get more of their contributions from outside the district. Finally, members from larger districts and states get larger ratios of in-district contributions. It also appears that a member's committee memberships do not significantly influence fundraising from individual donors. This result differs from the PAC literature that argues members are able to leverage campaign contributions based on committee assignments.
When we separate the sample by party in models 3 and 4, we begin to see some important differences. In order to make comparisons easier for our main independent variable, we created Figure 3 . Figure 3 provides 95 percent confidence intervals for the coefficients so we can determine if there are meaningful differences between the two parties. We see that in the period immediately following redistricting, the effect for Republicans is nearly twice as large and significantly different when compared to Democratic incumbents. This means that as districts represented by Republican incumbents change, members are receiving a smaller ratio of indistrict contributions. 19 This supports our hypothesis that investors will try before they buy, cautiously observing their new representatives before contributing to their reelection campaigns.
It is also consistent with the idea that investors will reward their "old" representatives for past behavior. Over time, the results show that for Republicans, the first period effect is large, decreases in the second period and by the last period the coefficient is not different from zero. In contrast, the effect for Democrats is nearly the same for each of the post-redistricting elections.
The Democrat's relationships with individual contributors suffer less initially but recover more slowly following district change compared to the Republican's. These results are consistent with our secondary hypotheses.
Some of the control variables also highlight interesting partisan differences. Returning back to Table 1 , we see the coefficient on the seniority variable is over twice as large for
Republicans. This means they get better faster at attracting contributions from outside their districts. As BCRA went into effect and the maximum contribution increased, it appears that
Democrat members benefited with more money coming from donors inside their districts while the effect ran in the other direction for Republicans. Finally, in model 5, we find that district changes had no influence on contributions from outside the state. This makes sense because the contributors did not receive the redistricting treatment.
Discussion
In the preceding sections, we discussed a model and presented results that showed redistricting correlates with members receiving more out-of-district contributions. In order to explore this topic, we present a few pieces of information culled from zip code level census data. 21 In Figure 4 , we provide a breakdown of individual contribution amounts by income category. In each category, we show how much money was contributed from our three groups, in-district, rest-of-state, and out-of-state contributors. As expected, relatively little money comes from the lower income levels and a great deal comes from the richest 10 percent of zip codes. Across the first eight levels, there are no vast differences between the three groups.
Once we get to the highest income category, however, we find substantially more contributions to out-of-district representatives. In some ways this is not surprising since donors are limited on how much they can give to one member and individuals who want to make several contributions will have to send money outside their district to do so. The result is that lots of money from wealthy zip codes, with potential demands attached, is flowing into other districts and this pattern is aggravated by redistricting.
Next, Figure 5 presents similar data, this time looking at the number of children per household in contributor zip codes. These results show that areas with few children are contributing large sums of money to members living outside their districts. This is not just a function of the age of the donor as we do not find similar results when we look at contributions 21 Ideally we would have individual level data on donors but we do not. This sets up an ecological inference problem that we should point out to the reader.
based on the median age in a zip code. This result is interesting especially given the recent voting gaps present between families and single individuals in the 2012 presidential election. In both of these cases donations that are coming into congressional districts originated from economically and socially distinct geographies.
Finally, we think it is worth exploring the relationship between where members collect contributions and their voting behavior. To examine this possibility we again turn to the panel regression but instead of using the ratio of in-district to rest-of-state contributions as the dependent variable, we use it as an independent variable. We also included an additional control from before, the district's Incumbent Presidential Vote for the incumbent's party from the prior presidential election. The dependent variable here is the absolute value of the incumbent's first dimension DW-NOMINATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) where members become more extreme as this variable increases.
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The results in Table 2 show a small, but statistically significant relationship between the ratio of in-district contributions and how a member votes, controlling for underlying district preferences. As this ratio increases, meaning an incumbent is receiving a larger share of contributions from inside his or her district, the member votes in a less extreme fashion. 23 While these results are not causal, they once again point to differences between in and out of district contributions and redistricting.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated that the more districts change, members of Congress bring in larger shares of individual campaign contributions from outside of the districts they were elected to represent. As time passes, the effect grows smaller, but it never returns to preredistricting levels for the average member. We also found the effect was larger for Republicans in the election immediately following redistricting but not significant by the time of the next redistricting. The effect was smaller, but consistently significant for Democrats in each of the five elections following a change in district boundaries. We also showed that contributions that come from outside the district originate from zip codes that are in the top ten percent of wealth and have households with relatively few children. These results suggest that redistricting affects the fundamental relationship between a representative and his or her supporters in a manner that has not been previously reported. District change tends to reduce a member's reliance on his or her own geographic constituents and increase the member's financial ties to outside sources with distinct political interests.
Although these results are instructive, we feel there is still more work to be done. In particular, we want to move beyond the aggregate member level results we presented here and focus on individual donors. This will require using "big data" techniques and match names within zip codes over time. This is potentially problematic because reports to the FEC are not always consistent and a donations listed from Robert Smith in one year may be labeled as coming from Bob Smith in another year. If we can accomplish this task, we will be able to better understand how redistricting influences not just members, but the individuals who reside on the changing districts. 
